New York Times Article, 5 Dec 03
Fly Me to L 1
By BUZZ ALDRIN
LOS ANGELES
For the last 24 hours, news reports have been soaring into orbit that
President Bush and NASA are busy preparing their
vision for the future of America's space program — and that this vision may
involve sending astronauts back to the moon,
and perhaps establishing some sort of permanent base there. I applaud the
instinct, but I think that a moon shot alone
seems more like reaching for past glory than striving for new triumphs.
Instead, I think the next step in our space program should be to create a
floating launching pad for manned and unmanned
missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond. This is not a task for the
unfinished International Space Station, which is
intended to be a floating laboratory rather than a bridge to the heavens.
A much more practical destination than the moon or the space station is a
region of space called L 1, which is more than
two-thirds of the way to the moon and is where the gravity fields between
the Earth and Moon are in balance. Setting up a
space port there would offer a highly stable platform from which spacecraft
could head toward near-Earth asteroids, the
lunar surface, the moons of Mars and wherever else mankind decides to travel.
Unlike the Moon and the International Space Station, which is in low-earth
orbit, L 1 is not the site of strong gravitational
pulls, meaning that spacecraft can leave there without using much energy.
Thus L 1 would be the most sensible position
for a base that would function as a test area and way-point for robotic
flights as well as a support station and safe haven for
human exploration of the solar system.
It would also be relatively cheap, at least in terms of space travel. To
create a port at L 1 we can use the building methods
that have already proved successful for Skylab and the International Space
Station — and we can probably get it up and
running for $10 billion to $15 billion, significantly less than the
International Space Station, which will likely exceed $100
billion in the end. We can also save money by shifting away from using the
space shuttle as the transport vehicle and by
developing a new, more flexible launch vehicle and crew module to get
people and cargo up to the L 1 port.
Unfortunately, NASA's work on future vehicles — including the
much-ballyhooed "orbital space plane" — has stalled since
the disaster with the Shuttle Columbia. And even before then, the agency
had been focusing on the wrong sort of craft: one
limited to transporting four astronauts at a time with little or no
cargo-carrying capability. Such a craft would essentially be
duplicating what the Russian Soyuz craft already does adequately: bringing
several astronauts up and back from a space
station, but little else. Moreover, NASA's "Supersized Soyuz" approach
focuses only on serving the International Space
Station, rather than working toward a more expansive vision.
There are better ways to invest our money in a new craft. One that would be
relatively quick and easy would be to keep
what works in the current space transportation system — the rocket
boosters, external tank and trained staff — and combine
them with new elements. The tanks and boosters we now use will soon be
predictable and safe, as a part of NASA's
post-Columbia efforts. And if we stick with them, no new buildings or
untested ground-transportation methods would need
to be built.
The big change would be to replace the aging shuttle orbiter with a new
crew module that would hold perhaps eight or
more astronauts, and build a so-called heavy-lift vehicle, capable of
carrying cargo, that would attach behind the module.
This craft would be capable of variable crew and cargo configurations. The
crew module would need built-in escape and
rescue capabilities for the people aboard. The early version might have to
make parachute or parafoil landings in the
ocean, although eventually it should be modified to make runway landings.
Over time, more powerful engines and reusable rocket boosters could be
added to make possible sending even larger
payloads and more passengers into space at a lower cost per person and per
pound. But the important thing for the
president to think about at this point is the long-term future of space
flight and for NASA to pursue all avenues, big and
small, to come up with the best plan.
Unfortunately, NASA has limited its $135 million orbital space plane
development contracts to a few giants: proposals by
Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. As a result, the space agency
has shut the door on the smaller,
entrepreneurial companies that are responsible for some of the most
innovative current thinking on space technology. The
farther reaching scope of an L 1 effort calls for collaboration and
competition — two qualities that should be part of the
cultural change NASA pledged to undertake after loss of the Columbia.
In addition, NASA might even look at a new competitor as a possible
partner. The modernized, Soyuz-like manned
capsule that China sent into orbit in October is potentially safer and
seems technologically more robust than the Russian
version. Working jointly with China would not only fill a needed gap when
America's agreement with Russia on using
Soyuz runs out in 2006, but it would also make a potentially important
political alliance. China and America are on the
verge of a new space race — with economic competition expected from Japan,
Europe and perhaps India — and it is better
to start off with cooperation than with confrontation.
The tragedy of the Columbia, combined with China's successful launch, have
put NASA at a crossroads. America's
continued leadership in space depends on decisions made now. President Bush
should realize that the first step is a bold
new vision from the top.
Buzz Aldrin, an astronaut on the Apollo XI moon mission, is chairman of
Starcraft Boosters, which develops reusable
booster rockets for spacecraft.